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LAWYER SPEECH IN THE REGULATORY STATE 
Renee Newman Knake* 
 
[C]riticism of their colleagues by public employees should be considered 
one of the most highly valued of speech activities . . . .1 
*     *    * 
[T]he speech of a lawyer[] . . . is subject to independent regulation by 
canons of the profession.  Those canons provide an obligation to speak in 
certain instances.  And where that is so, the government’s own interest in 
forbidding that speech is diminished.2 
INTRODUCTION 
The expansion of the modern regulatory state demands a corresponding 
safeguard to ensure that officials act in the public’s interest and advance 
democratic values.3  Preserving space for free-flowing speech about 
corruption, illegal behavior, and other wrongdoing within the government 
agency workplace is an important way to protect the public, promote 
democracy, and preserve institutional legitimacy.  While it is true that “[t]he 
tendency of officials to abuse their public trust is a theme that has 
permeated political thought from classical times to the present,”4 the value 
of speech directed to curb the abuse of power is especially high in our 
modern era of massive government bureaucracy5 accompanied by the rise 
 
*  Many thanks to the participants of the Fordham Law Review colloquium on Lawyering in 
the Regulatory State and especially to Bruce Green, Russ Pearce, and Laurel Terry for their 
thoughtful comments.  For an overview of the colloquium, see Nancy J. Moore, Foreword:  
Lawyering in the Regulatory State, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2016). 
 
 1. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 634. 
 2. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 446 (2006) (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
 3. Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of Federal Agency Lawyers, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1181 (2002).  Whereas the public interest is typically meant to 
“connote a single, transcendent outcome that would best serve community welfare without 
reference to democratically expressed preferences,” the notion of democratic values 
“connotes those aspects of agency decisionmaking that promote the agency’s legitimacy in a 
democratic system of government.” Id.  “These democratic values include conformity with 
established law, public participation, and sensitivity to discernible public preferences,” 
among other things. Id. 
 4. Blasi, supra note 1, at 529 (citations omitted) (referencing philosophers and theorists 
such as Aristotle, Montesquieu, Madison, Mill, Cooke, Locke, and Popper). 
 5. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 421, 421–22 (1987) (“The post-New Deal increase in presidential power, and the 
creation of a massive bureaucracy concentrated in the executive branch, have augmented 
factional power and self-interested representation, often leading to regulation that fails to 
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of the “national surveillance state.”6  This is because, while courts may “set 
the constitutional contours” of the regulatory state, it is administrative 
agencies that determine the functional day-to-day application.7  Indeed, 
“[i]n many areas, the constitutional law enunciated in formal [agency] 
opinions and memoranda . . . is sometimes at least as important as any 
decision of Article III courts.”8 
One obvious source of a check on government power in the regulatory 
state is government employee speech.  Under current First Amendment 
jurisprudence, however, minimal protection exists for this sort of speech.  
This is true even for government lawyers and judges,9 despite the unique 
professional obligations required of those licensed to practice law or hold 
judicial office. 
The minimal protection for the speech of lawyers employed by the 
regulatory state is surprising given the special duties placed on members of 
the legal profession, which demand greater accountability as officers of the 
court and conservators of the rule of law than what is expected of most 
government employees.  These obligations are even higher for members of 
the legal profession working in government office than for private 
attorneys, because government lawyers and judges “cannot be partisan 
advocates for any single position.  Quite the opposite, [they] must pay heed 
to a range of parties and interests when undertaking any action.”10  This 
treatment of lawyer speech is also surprising because lawyers employed by 
the regulatory state increasingly function as whistleblowers,11 
 
serve the interests of the public at large.”).  From 2009 to 2012, Sunstein was Administrator 
of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs for the Obama 
Administration. See Cass R. Sunstein, HARV. L. SCH., http://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/ 
directory/10871/Sunstein (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [https://perma.cc/H3H7-UYJ6]. 
 6. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change:  
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 
489–90 (2006). 
 7. Alan B. Morrison, What If . . . Buckley Were Overturned?, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 
347, 347 (1999). 
 8. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6, at 498.  According to Professors Balkin and 
Levinson, “The most obvious example over the past five years is the [Office of Legal 
Counsel within the Department of Justice’s] enunciation of the broad scope of presidential 
power in foreign affairs, leading, in one notorious example, to a crabbed and narrow reading 
of what constitutes ‘torture’ banned by domestic law and international treaties” which “also 
offered . . . highly disturbing views about the essentially unconstrained powers that the 
President enjoys under Article II.” Id. at 498–99. 
 9. It is notable that the two U.S. Supreme Court decisions most damaging to First 
Amendment protection for government employee speech involve lawyers. See Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (holding that the First Amendment rights of an assistant district 
attorney discharged for circulation of a questionnaire regarding office conditions to 
coworkers were not violated); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that the 
First Amendment rights of a prosecutor who experienced retaliation after reporting 
investigatory misconduct were not violated). 
 10. Note, supra note 3, at 1181. 
 11. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties:  Speech Rights and Duties Within 
Twenty-First-Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245 (2009) (discussing 
concerns present when public and private sector attorneys are not protected for 
whistleblowing). 
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gatekeepers,12 and compliance officers.13  Many also serve in quasi-judicial 
roles within various administrative agencies.14 
As the regulatory state continues to grow,15 the public is in greater need 
of affordable, well-organized governmental accountability.  One solution 
might be to offer greater First Amendment protection to all government 
employees acting in a whistleblowing, gatekeeping, or compliance capacity.  
This expansion, however, surely would come at the cost of efficiency and 
control of the workplace for the government acting as an employer to 
manage day-to-day office functions.16  Another solution is to offer greater 
protection to some, but not all, government employees.  The latter is 
explored here—strong protection for government lawyer speech when 
engaged in assessment of the workplace.  This speech has been described as 
“speech about ‘the manner in which government is operated[,] the 
protection of which was a central purpose of the First Amendment.”17  To 
be clear, in this Article I am concerned about a very specific sort of speech 
by lawyers:  what I will call workplace assessment—namely, the speech 
that serves as a check on government abuse by “information providing,” 
 
 12. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, An Interpretation of Recent Developments in the Regulation 
of Law Practice, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 559, 595–603, 608 (2005) (detailing several 
developments and trends, such as:  “a shift in the regulatory center of gravity toward 
Washington with a corresponding shift from judicial to legislative and administrative 
regulation; [and a] greater emphasis on regulation that makes lawyers gatekeepers in order to 
protect public or third-party, rather than client, interests”); see also David B. Wilkins, 
Making Context Count:  Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 
1164 (1993) (citing Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers:  The Anatomy of a Third-Party 
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986)) (identifying the lawyer’s role in 
preventing client misconduct by employing the “gatekeeper strategy” in which “the lawyer 
can refuse to participate in the disputed transaction or otherwise withhold support in a 
manner that makes it more difficult for the client to accomplish its illicit purpose”). 
 13. See, e.g., Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance:  Why 
Departmentalization May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71 (2014). 
 14. See, e.g., Terence G. Ison, Administrative Law—The Operational Realities, 22 CAN. 
J.  ADMIN. L. & PRAC. 315 (2009). 
 15. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 
MD. L. REV. 1183, 1184 (1995) (citations omitted) (observing that “[i]n the last thirty years, 
we also have witnessed a spectacular growth of the federal regulatory state” and listing 
examples of “a vast range of social legislation establishing new responsibilities, rights, and 
remedies to protect the environment, public health, and occupational safety”).  Expanded 
protection under the First Amendment has paralleled the growth of the regulatory state, 
though not in the contexts of government employee or government lawyer speech. See David 
Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699, 1730 (1991) (“Not only did 
the post-New Deal government possess unprecedented interventionist powers, but it 
consolidated these powers within relatively unaccountable administrative agencies.  Faced 
with the task of reconstituting the Founding commitment to liberty in response to these 
challenges, the Court invigorated the Bill of Rights’ non-economic guarantees of personal 
freedom—most energetically, the speech and press clauses of the First Amendment.”). 
 16. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 
149–54 (1983). 
 17. Connick, 461 U.S. at 156 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 
U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). 
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“watchdogging,” or “whistleblowing.”18  As Randy Kozel explains in 
defining these terms: 
When an employee keeps the public abreast of office operations and 
issues, she is performing an information-providing function.  When the 
information she is providing pertains to potential inefficiencies in the 
employer’s office, she is performing a watchdogging function.  And when 
the topics of her speech are not inefficiencies but illegalities, she is 
performing a whistleblowing function.19 
Professional and occupational speech, and especially lawyer speech, 
historically has received scant attention from First Amendment theorists.20  
Recently, however, a handful of scholars have turned their attention to this 
topic, perhaps in part due to the controversial nature of Garcetti v. 
Ceballos,21 as well as increased focus on occupational licensing22 and 
publicity surrounding government lawyers as whistleblowers.23  The 
attention may also be a function of a recent spate of decisions among lower 
courts involving the level of scrutiny to be applied when a government 
employee’s speech is restricted.24  Or it could be due simply to the 
expanding number of government lawyers.  As the regulatory state has 
grown at all levels in local, state, and federal government, so has the 
number of government attorneys—126,450 employed in the United States 
in 2014 according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, or 21 percent of all 
 
 18. See Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 
1007, 1038 (2005). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
305, 305 (2001) (“One of the most important unanswered questions in legal ethics is how the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression ought to apply to the speech of attorneys 
acting in their official capacity.”).  This is especially true regarding scholarship about the 
ethical obligations of government lawyers. See Allan C. Hutchinson, ‘In the Public Interest’:  
The Responsibilities and Rights of Government Lawyers, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 105, 106 
(2008) (“[L]ittle energy has been directed towards defining and defending the role and duties 
of government lawyers.  Not only do the various official codes of professional conduct 
remain almost silent . . . there is also a paucity of academic literature and professional 
commentary . . . .”). 
 21. 547 U.S. 410 (2006); see, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Worst Supreme Court Case 
Ever?  Identifying, Assessing, and Exploring Low Moments of the High Court, 12 NEV. L.J. 
516, 523 (2012) (“My own pick for ‘worst’ case is Garcetti v. Ceballos, in which the Court 
denied a retaliatory discharge claim based on the purported First Amendment rights of a 
government employee . . . .”). 
 22. See, e.g., Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 
HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 165 (2015) (critiquing the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision striking a 
licensing requirement for tour guides on First Amendment grounds and observing that 
“[u]ntil very recently, it was well accepted that purely economic regulations are subject to 
rational basis review”). 
 23. See, e.g., Jesselyn Radack, When Whistle-Blowers Suffer, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 27, 
2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/27/opinion/la-oe-radack-20100427 [https:// 
perma.cc/P2M9-WXYK]; see also Heidi Kitrosser, Leak Prosecutions and the First 
Amendment:  New Developments and a Closer Look at the Feasibility of Protecting Leakers, 
56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1221 (2015). 
 24. See, e.g., Julian W. Kleinbrodt, Pro-Whistleblower Reform in the Post-Garcetti Era, 
112 MICH. L. REV. 111, 115 (2013) (“Garcetti has produced general confusion in the lower 
courts.” (citations omitted)). 
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lawyers.25  This is an increase from 105,130 government attorneys a decade 
ago (20 percent of all lawyers)26 and only 38,062 half a century ago (14.2 
percent of all lawyers).27 
In my earlier work, I articulated a First Amendment theory supporting 
strong protection for attorney advice and advocacy.28  In my view, a 
lawyer’s speech as advisor and advocate not only holds First Amendment 
value for the client and for the public, but also for the functioning of 
American democracy.29  This is supported both by foundational values 
undergirding the First Amendment as well as Supreme Court doctrine.30  In 
this Article, I build upon that analysis to posit that lawyers for the 
regulatory state ought not to be treated as government employees for 
purposes of the First Amendment when engaged in speech about workplace 
conditions related to curbing abuse of power, corruption, or other illegality.  
While my position runs counter to the existing precedent of closely divided 
Supreme Court decisions, it finds support in a historical and philosophical 
understanding of free speech principles. 
The workplace assessment speech I am contemplating here goes to the 
heart of First Amendment values.  Consider, for example, the “checking 
value” of lawyer speech for the regulatory state.31  Lawyers often will be in 
the best position to act as a check on government abuse of power in light of 
the responsibilities placed upon the legal profession to maintain our 
democratic form of government.32  As such, this Article suggests that the 
 
 25. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT 
AND WAGES, MAY 2014 (2014), http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes231011.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/4AVT-FXZ3].  This figure includes 52,550 local government lawyers, 39,790 state 
government lawyers, and 34,220 federal executive branch lawyers. Id.  The total number of 
lawyers for 2014 according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics was 603,310. Id. 
 26. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT 
AND WAGES, MAY 2004 (2004), http://www.bls.gov/oes/2004/may/oes231011.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/SP73-3HX7].  This figure includes 48,760 local government lawyers, 32,100 state 
government lawyers, and 24,270 federal executive branch lawyers. Id.  According to the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, the total number of lawyers for 2004 was 521,130. Id. 
 27. AM. BAR FOUND., THE 1971 LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT 12 (Bette H. Sikes et al. 
eds., 1972) (statistics from 1963).  The total number of lawyers in 1963 was 269,069, 
according to the report. Id. at 5. 
 28. See generally Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First Amendment, 68 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 639 (2012). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. at 675–77 (discussing philosophical foundations for protecting attorney 
advice under the First Amendment); id. at 664–72 (discussing doctrinal foundations for 
protecting attorney advice under the First Amendment, including Legal Services Corp. v. 
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001), Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), and 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)). 
 31. See Blasi, supra note 1, at 521. 
 32. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (“[L]awyers are 
essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically 
been ‘officers of the courts.’” (quoting Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 383 
(1963))); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶¶ 10–11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (“The 
legal profession is largely self-governing. . . .  [It] is unique in this respect because of the 
close relationship between the profession and the processes of government and law 
enforcement.”).  As such, “[s]elf-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession’s 
independence from government domination.” Id.  This is critical because “[a]n independent 
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speech of lawyers for the regulatory state warrants heightened protection 
when it is serving this checking-value function. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I critiques two highly controversial 
split decisions from the Supreme Court ascribing minimal First Amendment 
protection to government lawyer speech—Connick v. Meyers33 and Garcetti 
v. Ceballos.34  While I certainly am not the first to question the outcomes of 
Connick and Garcetti (indeed, some call Garcetti one of the worst Supreme 
Court opinions ever),35 the significance of workplace assessment speech by 
lawyers in the context of the regulatory state largely has escaped the 
attention of commentators and courts.36  This Article helps fill that void. 
Part II then turns to an explanation of why lawyers are different from 
other government employees.  Here, I explore three justifications for 
heightened protection.  First, government lawyers’ speech, because of their 
special training and education, can serve important political functions, 
including acting as a check against government misconduct.  Second, the 
speech of lawyers is subject to special professional duties not typically 
placed on government employees.  Third, similar to judges, lawyers serving 
the regulatory state must act beyond the interests that guide a private 
practice attorney, taking into account the agency’s role within the overall 
government structure as well as the public’s interest. 
The conclusion proposes a framework to be applied to the workplace 
assessment speech of government lawyers when acting as a check on the 
power of the regulatory state.  By applying this framework, rather than what 
the Court did in Connick and Garcetti, in the future, members of the legal 
profession faced with concerns about governmental abuse of power will be 
permitted to exercise professional judgment to report wrongdoing—and be 
protected when they do so.  Protecting government lawyers’ workplace 
assessment speech can serve as a critical check against abuse of power by 
officials and help legitimize the role of the regulatory state in American 
democracy. 
 
legal profession is an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal 
authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on 
government for the right to practice.” Id. 
 33. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 34. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 35. See Stempel, supra note 21, at 523. 
 36. A Lexis search for sources addressing the First Amendment protection for 
government employee speech resulted in over 1000 articles, compared to only a dozen or so 
articles focusing specifically on the speech of lawyers and judges as whistleblowing 
government employees in the wake of Connick and Garcetti.  This search was conducted on 
July 2, 2015, and the results are on file with the author.  Perhaps this is due to a systemic 
inattention to members of the legal profession as employees of the regulatory state—it has 
been observed that “[g]overnment lawyers are the orphans of legal ethics.” Hutchinson, 
supra note 20, at 106. 
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I.  THE EVOLUTION OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR 
WORKPLACE ASSESSMENT SPEECH BY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .37 
The First Amendment protects the freedom of expression without regard 
to content or viewpoint, even if it is unpleasant, disruptive, vulgar, 
offensive, or insulting.  This protection, however, is not absolute, and the 
government may limit speech in a number of ways, whether as the 
sovereign, a regulator of professions and industries, or an employer.38  For 
example, in its capacity as a sovereign, the government may establish time, 
place, and manner restrictions.39  The government can restrict unprotected 
speech40 and decide what viewpoints may be expressed in its own speech.41  
Reasonable, content-based restrictions can be placed on which speech is 
permissible on government property that is not fully open to the public.42  
The government often restricts speech as the regulator of professions and 
industries, for example as the regulator of lawyers,43 judges,44 prison 
administrators,45 radio/television stations,46 and the military.47 
 
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 38. See infra notes 39–49. 
 39. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (“[G]overnment 
has no power to restrict such activity because of its message.  Our cases make equally clear, 
however, that reasonable ‘time, place[,] and manner’ regulations may be necessary to further 
significant governmental interests, and are permitted.” (citations omitted)). 
 40. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“[I]t is well 
understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all 
circumstances.  There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem.” (citations omitted)). 
 41. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (“The Government can, without 
violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it 
believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program 
which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.  In so doing, the Government has not 
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the 
exclusion of the other.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 811 
(1985) (“Although the avoidance of controversy is not a valid ground for restricting speech 
in a public forum, a nonpublic forum . . . is not dedicated to general debate or the free 
exchange of ideas.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991) (“It is 
unquestionable that in the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to 
‘free speech’ an attorney has is extremely circumscribed.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015) (“States prohibit 
judges and judicial candidates from personally soliciting funds for their campaigns.  [The 
Court] must decide whether the First Amendment permits such restrictions on speech.  [The 
Court] hold[s] that it does.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 86 (1987) (“The Court rejected the inmates’ 
First Amendment challenge to the ban . . . noting that judgments regarding prison security 
‘are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, 
and . . . courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.’” (quoting 
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974))). 
 46. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969) (“[T]he Congress 
and the Commission do not violate the First Amendment when they require a radio or 
television station to give reply time to answer personal attacks and political editorials.”). 
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Relevant to this Article, the government may also regulate the speech of 
its employees, including government lawyers.48  Government employee 
speech historically received no First Amendment protection.  Justice 
Holmes is famous for his line that a policeman “may have a constitutional 
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”49  
In other words, government employees had to accept their employment “on 
the terms which [were] offered” to them.50 
The Warren Court’s focus on individual rights,51 however, led to greater 
protection for government employee speech in Pickering v. Board of 
Education.52  The case involved a public school teacher fired for publishing 
a letter to the editor critical of tax policy proposed by the Board of 
Education.53  This is an example of the government employee as an 
information provider and a watchdog.54  The Court found that government 
employees do not sacrifice all free speech rights as a condition of their 
employment; rather, there must be “a balance between the interests of the 
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the 
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employees.”55  Using this balancing 
test, the Court held that the teacher’s speech was protected because it 
related to a matter of public concern and did not interfere with the efficient 
operation of the school.56  The Court later extended Pickering protection to 
a government employee speaking privately to a supervisor.57  Even when 
the Court extends less protection, it recognizes that “[g]overnment 
employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for 
which they work; public debate may gain much from their informed 
opinions.”58 
Subsequent decisions, however, weakened Pickering’s protection and, 
interestingly, repeatedly involved workplace assessment speech by a 
 
 47. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974) (“For the reasons which 
differentiate military society from civilian society, we think Congress is permitted to 
legislate both with greater breadth and with greater flexibility when prescribing the rules by 
which the former shall be governed than it is when prescribing rules for the latter.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (“[T]he Government, as an 
employer, must have wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel and 
internal affairs.”). 
 49. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892) (upholding an 
ordinance banning police officers from political fundraising). 
 50. Id. at 518. 
 51. See, e.g., William F. Swindler, The Warren Court:  Completion of a Constitutional 
Revolution, 23 VAND. L. REV. 205 (1970). 
 52. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 53. Id. at 564–65. 
 54. Kozel, supra note 18, at 1038 (“Teachers are, as a class, the members of a 
community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to 
the operation of the schools should be spent.  Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to 
speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.” (quoting Pickering, 
391 U.S. at 572)). 
 55. Id. at 1015 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). 
 56. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572. 
 57. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979). 
 58. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994). 
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government lawyer.59  Connick, decided in 1983, involved a lawyer 
working in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office,60 and Garcetti, 
decided in 2006, involved a lawyer working in the Los Angeles County 
District Attorney’s office.61  As this Article goes to print, we sit at the 
decade anniversary of Garcetti.  This marks an important moment to reflect 
upon the decision’s consequences for the government lawyer’s role and 
duties engaging in workplace assessment in a regulatory state, particularly 
given that the opinion is perhaps the most disparaged free speech case ever 
rendered by the Court.  A brief overview of both cases lays out the critical 
tensions involved when the government, as an employer, seeks to manage 
the workplace by silencing speech on government abuse. 
A.  Connick v. Myers 
In Connick v. Myers, an assistant district attorney’s employment was 
terminated based on her circulation of a questionnaire addressing workplace 
concerns.62  Sheila Myers argued that this violated her First Amendment 
rights.63  The Supreme Court held 5-4 that it did not.64  The Court reached 
this result by adopting a “public concern” threshold test to be satisfied 
before applying a Pickering analysis.65  Immediately prior to Myers’s 
termination, she had distributed a “questionnaire soliciting the views of her 
fellow staff members concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the 
need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and 
whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns.”66  Her 
supervisor, District Attorney Harry Connick, soon informed her that “she 
was being terminated because of her refusal to accept the transfer . . . [and] 
that her distribution of the questionnaire was considered an act of 
insubordination.”67 
Although she won her wrongful termination claim in the lower court, the 
Supreme Court overturned that result because the majority did not view the 
questionnaire as sufficiently addressing matters of public concern.68  The 
one exception, according to Justice White writing for the majority, was the 
question about whether employees felt pressured to work in a political 
campaign.69  But after evaluating the context surrounding Myers’s writing 
and distribution of the questionnaire, the majority determined that the rest 
of the questions were “mere extensions of Myers’[s] dispute over her 
transfer to another section of the criminal court.”70 
 
 59. See infra Part I.A–B. 
 60. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 61. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 62. Connick, 461 U.S. 138. 
 63. Id. at 141. 
 64. Id. at 139. 
 65. Id. at 142. 
 66. Id. at 141. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 154. 
 69. Id. at 149. 
 70. Id. at 148. 
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The majority failed to recognize, as Justice Brennan observed in writing 
for the dissent, that “[t]he First Amendment affords special protection to 
speech that may inform public debate about how our society is to be 
governed—regardless of whether it actually becomes the subject of a public 
controversy.”71  For Justice Brennan, and Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and 
Stevens joining his opinion, the proper application of a public concern test 
would cover the very matters at issue in Myers’s questionnaire.  This would 
include issues “that could reasonably be expected to be of interest to 
persons seeking to develop informed opinions about the manner in which 
the Orleans Parish District Attorney, an elected official charged with 
managing a vital governmental agency, discharges his responsibilities.”72 
With the benefit of hindsight, we see that Justice Brennan was prescient 
in his observations about the value of the speech at issue in Connick.  The 
Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office, as it turns out, permitted for 
decades a workplace culture that led to significant prosecutorial 
misconduct, in some instances causing the wrongful incarceration of 
innocent individuals for many years.73  As a New York Times article 
published nearly thirty years later documented: 
 For the third time in 16 years and the second time in two, the Orleans 
Parish district attorney’s office must explain itself before the United 
States Supreme Court. 
 Each of the cases involves charges of prosecutorial misconduct, and in 
particular the failure to turn over crucial evidence to the defense, a 
constitutional violation that defense lawyers, former prosecutors and four 
Supreme Court justices have said was at least at one time “pervasive” in 
the district attorney’s office here.  In the case last year, one of the key 
issues was not whether the misconduct took place, but how widespread it 
was. . . .  Justice John Paul Stevens called the office’s violations “blatant 
and repeated.”74 
Admittedly, Myers’s questionnaire did not directly address this particular 
misconduct; but her workplace assessment speech—asking questions about 
the pressures faced by employees, the working performance of personnel, 
office morale, and the benefit of an internal employee grievance 
 
 71. Id. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. at 163. 
 73. See, e.g., David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability After 
Connick v. Thompson:  Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect 
Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J.F. 203, 207–08 (2011) (describing the 
wrongful conviction of John Thompson, who spent fourteen years on death row because the 
Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office withheld exculpatory evidence (citation omitted)).  
Keenan et al. also note that Harry Connick, as the District Attorney of Orleans Parish, 
“offered no formal training to its prosecutors regarding [exculpatory] evidence.” Id. at 207.  
Connick 
stopped reading legal opinions after he came to office in 1974 and was therefore 
unaware of important Supreme Court rulings . . . .  Shortly after Connick’s 
retirement, “a survey of assistant district attorneys in the Office revealed that more 
than half felt they had not received the training they needed to do their jobs.” 
Id. at 207–08. 
 74. Campbell Robertson & Adam Liptak, Louisiana Prosecutors’ Methods Raise 
Scrutiny Again, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2011, at A19. 
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committee—might very well have uncovered concerns about the 
misconduct resulting in multiple wrongful convictions as well as other 
information that is a matter of public concern.75  Myers’s information 
providing and watchdogging was intended to uncover a workplace culture 
that we now know, sadly all too well, led to substantial government abuse. 
B.  Garcetti v. Ceballos 
Two decades after Connick, the Court again addressed the scope of First 
Amendment protection for government employees by taking up another 
case involving an attorney, this time at the Los Angeles District Attorney’s 
Office.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, again a 5-4 decision, came on the heels of 
“one of the worst police scandals in U.S. history, involving corruption and 
widespread abuses by an anti-gang unit of the LA Police 
Department . . . .”76  Eventually, this led “to the overturning of more than 
100 convictions, the departure of more than a dozen officers, [and] the 
payment of $70 million to victims . . . .”77  Richard Ceballos, a calendar 
attorney in the district attorney’s office, wrote a memorandum raising 
concerns about a case that involved possible police misconduct, specifically 
the use of an affidavit with “serious misrepresentations” to secure a search 
warrant.78  The memo led to a contentious meeting with his superiors,79 and 
he was subpoenaed by the defense.80  Ceballos alleged that his superiors 
retaliated against him by denying a promotion, among other things, for the 
memo he wrote, violating his First Amendment right to freedom of 
speech.81 
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, focused not on 
whether the speech was a matter of public concern (because it 
unquestionably was) but rather on whether the speech was made in 
furtherance of official employee duties.82  According to the majority, 
“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, 
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, 
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer 
discipline.”83  This is true “even if his judgment in this case was sound and 
appropriately expressed.”84  Thus, the majority concluded that Ceballos’s 
speech was not protected, even while simultaneously recognizing that 
“[e]xposing governmental inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of 
considerable significance . . . .”85  In other words, before applying 
Pickering, the Court first requires that an employee speak as a citizen on a 
 
 75. See generally Connick, 461 U.S. 138. 
 76. Brief for Respondent at 1, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-473). 
 77. Id. at 2. 
 78. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 415. 
 82. See id. at 413–26. 
 83. Id. at 421. 
 84. Id. at 432 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. at 425 (majority opinion). 
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matter of public concern—if the employee is not speaking as a private 
individual, then “the employee has no First Amendment cause of action 
based on his or her employer’s reaction to the speech.”86  This 
characterization ignores a fundamental aspect of the role of a lawyer, where 
professional obligations require a fidelity to the democratic process and rule 
of law, a point to which I return to below in Part II. 
Justice Souter, writing in dissent, characterized the First Amendment 
value of Ceballos’s speech differently.  He explained that the “private and 
public interests in addressing official wrongdoing and threats to health and 
safety can outweigh the government’s stake in the efficient 
implementation” of “its chosen policy and objectives.”87  According to 
Justice Souter, Ceballos should have been able to claim First Amendment 
protection when “speaking out against a rogue law enforcement officer, 
[regardless of whether] his job requires him to express a judgment about the 
officer’s performance.”88  The majority’s view, by contrast, seriously 
compromises any effort to encourage whistleblowing. 
Justice Souter also recognized the special obligations of lawyers which 
further inform the First Amendment value of workplace assessment speech:  
“Some public employees are hired to ‘promote a particular policy’ by 
broadcasting a particular message set by the government, but not everyone 
working for the government, after all, is hired to speak from a government 
manifesto.”89  Souter would have applied Legal Services Corp. v. 
Velazquez90 to protect the whistleblowing activity in Garcetti.91  In 
Velazquez, in a 5-4 decision also authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court 
struck down a federal restriction preventing attorneys for the Legal Services 
Corporation (LSC) from challenging the validity of a state or federal 
statute.92  Under the challenged restriction, the LSC attorneys were required 
to cease representation immediately if a question about a statute’s validity 
arose.93  Justice Kennedy’s opinion expressed the concern that, if the 
legislative restriction was validated by the Court, “there would be lingering 
doubt whether the truncated representation had resulted in . . . full advice to 
the client . . . .”94  As a consequence, both “[t]he courts and the public 
would” be left “to question the adequacy and fairness of professional 
representations . . . .”95  Recognizing the importance of “an informed, 
independent bar,”96 he further noted that “[w]e must be vigilant when 
Congress imposes rules and conditions which in effect insulate its own laws 
 
 86. Id. at 418. 
 87. Id. at 428 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 431. 
 89. Id. at 437 (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001)). 
 90. 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
 91. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 437. 
 92. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 536–37 (“[T]he restriction . . . prohibits legal representation 
funded by recipients of [Legal Services Corporation’s] moneys if the representation involves 
an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing welfare law.”). 
 93. Id. at 544–45. 
 94. Id. at 546. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 545. 
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from legitimate judicial challenge”97 brought by members of the legal 
profession.  Similarly, the outcome of Garcetti (as well as Connick) 
insulates the government from legitimate challenges brought by members of 
the legal profession.  Under Velazquez, government lawyer speech in this 
context ought to be protected. 
II.  WHY LAWYER SPEECH, AND GOVERNMENT LAWYER SPEECH, 
IS NOT GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE SPEECH 
Numerous commentators have critiqued the legacy of Connick and 
Garcetti, calling for reform.98  For example, as one scholar has observed, 
the outcomes of these cases undermine our democracy “by allowing 
government officials to punish, and thus deter, whistleblowing and other 
on-the-job speech that would otherwise inform voters’ views and facilitate 
their ability to hold the government politically accountable for its 
choices.”99  Others have argued that “the Court should have retained the 
Pickering-Connick balancing inquiry and not limited the scope of the First 
Amendment” in Garcetti100 and that the opinion “signals a significant shift 
away from free speech rights for government employees and, even worse, a 
restriction on the ability of the public to learn of government 
misconduct.”101 
A few scholars have endeavored to justify the Connick and Garcetti 
decisions.  For example, Robert Post would separate speech furthering the 
government’s “managerial” authority, which it draws upon in 
“administering its own institutions,” from the government’s “governance” 
authority, which it demands in order to “govern the general public.”102  This 
distinction is significant, according to Post, because it explains why 
“[m]anagerial authority is controlled by [F]irst [A]mendment rules different 
 
 97. Id. at 548; see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 787 (2000) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (“Laws punishing speech which protests the lawfulness or morality of the 
government’s own policy are the essence of the tyrannical power the First Amendment 
guards against.”). 
 98. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Kennedy Court:  October Term 2005, 9 GREEN 
BAG 2D 335, 341 (2006) (“Many fewer whistleblowers are likely to come forward without 
constitutional protection.”); Stempel, supra note 21; Mark Strasser, Whistleblowing, Public 
Employees, and the First Amendment, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 975, 976 (2013) (“As far as the 
Constitution is concerned, an individual who fulfills her professional duties by exposing 
corruption or threats to public health and safety may permissibly be fired.  If our recent 
history teaches us anything, it is that such an understanding of constitutional protections 
cannot help but undermine the public good.”). 
 99. Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech:  Government’s Control of Its 
Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2009). 
 100. See, e.g., Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and 
§ 1983:  A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2008). 
 101. Chemerinsky, supra note 98, at 340. 
 102. Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management:  The History and Theory of 
the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1775 (1987).  For another perspective justifying 
the outcome of Garcetti, see Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of 
Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 33 (2008) (rejecting “the scholarly 
consensus on Garcetti,” and observing that “although the Court’s opinion is admittedly 
undertheorized, its holding is consistent with fundamental principles of First Amendment 
law”). 
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from those which control the exercise of the authority used by the state 
when it acts to govern the general public.”103  As a consequence, he asserts 
in a case like Connick, “[m]anagerial domains are necessary so that a 
democratic state can actually achieve objectives that have been 
democratically agreed upon.”104 
My point here is narrower than these commentators, in part because of 
my belief that lawyer speech at times warrants higher protection under the 
First Amendment than that of others when the speech serves an advisory, 
advocacy, or assessment function.105  This view is grounded upon the 
premise that “a strong and forceful legal profession is a vital resource in 
holding governments to democratic account and guaranteeing that all 
citizens are empowered by vigorous representation in their dealings with 
governing bodies and other powerful elites.”106  Consequently, it is critical 
to view the protection of lawyer speech as the equivalent of protecting 
professional independence, thus facilitating lawyers’ ability to “act as a 
bulwark between state oppression and citizens’ freedom.”107 
As a pragmatic matter, I also recognize the administrative tensions 
involved if all government employee workplace assessment speech were 
protected fully under the First Amendment.  Given this reality, I do not join 
the chorus of critics who would extend the First Amendment to all 
employees.108  Instead, I contend that the speech of lawyers in this context 
deserves heightened protection for at least three reasons.  First, government 
lawyers and judges are uniquely poised to serve as a check against agency 
misconduct given their education and training.  Second, the speech of 
lawyers and judges is subject to special duties placed on members of the 
legal profession—duties which, at times, by their nature demand that they 
speak out against abuses of power.  Third, much like judges, government 
lawyers must function in a less partisan manner than their private 
counterparts, which makes them better prepared to engage in a reasoned, 
balanced inquiry in workplace assessment speech.  Each of these reasons is 
addressed in turn below. 
A.  The Checking Value of Lawyer Speech 
The speech of government lawyers can serve as a check against 
government misconduct, what Vincent Blasi calls the “checking value.”109  
 
 103. Post, supra note 102, at 1775. 
 104. Robert Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 164 (1996). 
 105. See Knake, supra note 28, at 682. 
 106. Hutchinson, supra note 20, at 109. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See, e.g., discussion supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text; see also Joshua D. 
Herman, The Limits on Disciplining Public Employee Speech, 103 ILL. B.J. 24, 26 (2015) 
(“Garcetti’s potential for quieting whistleblowers led the Illinois legislature to amend the 
Whistleblower Act and Illinois False Claims Act by providing protection for public 
employees who are no longer protected by the First Amendment.”); Howard L. Zwickel, In 
Support of an Implied State Constitutional Free Speech Tort in Public Employment 
Retaliation Cases, 78 ALB. L. REV. 33 (2015). 
 109. Blasi, supra note 1. 
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As Blasi explains:  “The central premise of the checking value is that the 
abuse of official power is an especially serious evil—more serious than the 
abuse of private power, even by institutions such as large corporations 
which can affect the lives of millions of people.”110  Blasi situates his idea 
of the checking value in an understanding of the “moral quality of official 
power”111: 
First, because the investiture of public power represents a form of moral 
approval, public servants are probably more likely than those who wield 
private power to lose their humility and acquire an inflated sense of self-
importance, often a critical first step on the road to misconduct.  Second, 
since public officials have been “chosen” by the people, either directly by 
election or indirectly via a chain of appointments anchored by an election, 
the public is probably less inherently skeptical of officials than of 
powerful private figures. . . .  Third, when trust is shown to have been 
abused, the cost to the society is greater if important expectations have 
been defeated.112 
He argues that, on balance, “systematic scrutiny and exposure of the 
activities of public officials will produce more good in the form of 
prevention or containment of official misbehavior.”113  Even if some 
“diminution in the efficiency of the public service or weakening of the trust 
that ultimately holds any political society together” might occur,114 this 
compromise, for Blasi, is a worthy and preferred tradeoff. 
Lawyers are particularly well suited to serve the checking function 
against governmental abuse given their education and training.115  For 
example, members of the legal profession can “serve as an important check 
on such unleashed power by informally restraining and channeling [a 
regulatory body’s] political will.  By training, [government] lawyers 
understand the importance of neutral principles, of fair processes, and of 
rational arguments . . . .”116  Similarly, government lawyers “perform the 
same function that Alexis de Tocqueville observed that they play in 
American society as a whole, that of restraining ill-considered 
democracy.”117  For example, while lawyers working for Congress “work to 
execute the will of Congress, [they] also act to temper that will, to ensure 
that it results from judgment as much as from passion.”118  Government 
 
 110. Id. at 538. 
 111. Id. at 540. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 552. 
 114. Id. 
 115. For example, Blasi has observed that because “recourse to the courts is one way that 
victims of official misconduct may put a halt to improper government practices, a proponent 
of the checking value should look favorably on the contention that the First Amendment 
protects communication designed to ‘stir up’ litigation” with “the government or its 
officials.” Id. at 647.  Blasi would not extend this position, however, to other cases holding 
that the First Amendment “includes the right to advise people on how they can secure 
effective legal representation.” Id. at 646 (citations omitted). 
 116. John C. Yoo, Lawyers in Congress, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 19 (1998). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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lawyers also “are a uniquely valuable source of information about the 
workings of public agencies.”119  Of course this may be true of any 
government employee, but providing higher protection at least to 
government lawyer speech advances “a societal interest in self-governance 
[that] does outweigh governmental efficiency” without over burdening the 
government’s managerial functions.120  This check on power is particularly 
important in light of the ever-expanding (and arguably unconstitutional121) 
regulatory state. 
Relatedly, members of the legal profession are uniquely trained to “be the 
conduit for . . . promulgation” of the rule of law.122  The complexity of law, 
which is increasing under the expanding regulatory state, demands lawyers 
to “make it accessible to those for whom it is relevant.”123  This is because 
“lawyers are often better positioned than nonlawyers to realize the 
unfairness or unreasonableness of a law.”124  The most “effective 
representation within and operation of the system” comes from lawyers as 
“sophisticated, experienced agents who know their way around the rule-
systems and the courts.”125  The education and training that prepares 
lawyers to navigate complex legal issues similarly makes them the preferred 
segment of government employees to engage in protected workplace 
assessment speech.  Moreover, it has been said that lawyers establish social 
order and the “normative vision” for American democracy.126  As such, 
they hold “a right to participate in the creation and maintenance of the 
state’s nomos that is denied to other persons in the society.”127  Indeed, “the 
state’s nomos is . . . dependent on the profession.”128 
B.  The Professional Obligations of Lawyers 
As Officers of the Court and Conservators of Democracy 
Lawyers, as members of the legal profession, have enhanced 
responsibilities because they are officers of the court and conservators of 
democracy.  These obligations not only justify protecting lawyer speech 
over other employees but also ameliorate concerns about such protection 
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Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1547 (1995). 
 123. Id. at 1547–48. 
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overly burdening the government’s interest in efficient administration of its 
work.  As Justice Breyer explained, dissenting in Garcetti: 
[T]he speech at issue is professional speech—the speech of a lawyer.  
Such speech is subject to independent regulation by canons of the 
profession.  Those canons provide an obligation to speak in certain 
instances.  And where that is so, the government’s own interest in 
forbidding that speech is diminished. . . .  The objective specificity and 
public availability of the profession’s canons also help to diminish the 
risk that the courts will improperly interfere with the government’s 
necessary authority to manage its work.129 
For example, the Preamble to the American Bar Association Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct explains that “[t]he legal profession is largely self-
governing. . . .  [It] is unique in this respect because of the close relationship 
between the profession and the processes of government and law 
enforcement.”130  As such, “[s]elf-regulation also helps maintain the legal 
profession’s independence from government domination.”131  This is 
critical because “[a]n independent legal profession is an important force in 
preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is more 
readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on 
government for the right to practice.”132  Lawyers in their professional 
capacity are simultaneously commanded to be “a representative of clients, 
an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special 
responsibility for the quality of justice.”133  These duties obligate lawyers to 
speak in certain instances beyond the scope of their employment 
requirements.  For example, Model Rule 1.13 contains a reporting 
requirement that is triggered when a lawyer knows of certain illegal 
behavior by an officer or employee of an organizational client, and Model 
Rule 3.3 demands disclosure of directly adverse legal authority.134 
These elements make the speech of lawyers working for the regulatory 
state different than the speech of other employees.  When lawyers speak in 
their employment capacity, they may or may not be speaking on behalf of 
 
 129. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 446–47 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
 130. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
 131. Id. ¶ 11. 
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 133. Id. ¶ 1. 
 134. See id. ¶ 1.13(b) (“If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or 
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their employer—the government—but they are always speaking on behalf 
of the legal profession. 
C.  The Heightened Professional Obligations 
of Government Lawyers 
Government lawyers, similar to judges, must function in a less partisan 
manner than their counterparts in private law practice, which better prepares 
them to conduct a reasoned, balanced inquiry when engaging in workplace 
assessment speech.  Two approaches, generally speaking, help explain the 
professional obligations ascribed to a lawyer employed by the regulatory 
state:  “the agency loyalty approach” and “the public interest approach.”135  
The agency loyalty approach “sharply limits the realm in which the lawyer 
may permissibly attempt to exert influence over the client.”136  Under this 
view, “the government lawyer’s client is the agency that employs the 
lawyer, and the lawyer owes the traditional duties of loyalty, zeal, and 
confidentiality to the agency just as the lawyer would to a private client.”137  
By contrast, the public interest approach “makes serving the public interest 
the government lawyer’s primary duty and consequently values the interests 
of the lawyer’s agency only to the extent that those interests coincide with 
the public interest.”138  The formulation of these approaches, of course, is 
not perfect, and a number of scholars and commentators have endeavored to 
critique and supplement them.139  Certainly under the public interest 
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framework for discussing how and why attorneys follow the rules”). See generally William 
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approach, and arguably even under the agency loyalty approach, courts 
recognize that government lawyers have heightened obligations as 
compared to lawyers engaged in private practice.  As the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals recognized, where members of the private bar “are 
appropriately concerned first and foremost with protecting their clients—
even those engaged in wrongdoing—from criminal charges and public 
exposure, government lawyers have a higher, competing duty to act in the 
public interest.”140  This duty stems from the concept of “the public trust” 
owed by a government lawyer, because the government overall “is 
responsible to the people in our democracy with its representative form of 
government. . . .  [T]he lawyer’s employment requires him to observe in the 
performance of his professional responsibility the public interest sought to 
be served by the governmental organization of which he is a part.”141  
Consequently, a government lawyer has an obligation to expose 
wrongdoing within government.142 
Some commentators have described government lawyers as being held to 
“the highest standard” possible as they are “admonished to ‘put loyalty to 
the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty to persons, party 
or Government department.’”143  This is true for several reasons.  First, 
“government lawyers cannot be partisan advocates for any single position.  
Quite the opposite, government lawyers must pay heed to a range of parties 
and interests when undertaking any action.”144  Second, “the government 
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lawyer’s primary goal should always be reconciliation—or at least 
accommodation—of as many interests as possible, rather than vindication 
of any single interest.”145  As a consequence, neither “the agency’s policy 
position” nor “abstract notions of the public good . . . can demand the 
lawyer’s unqualified allegiance.”146  Third, government lawyers have 
special responsibilities to serve the public good and to uphold the 
administration of justice.147  This “is an uncontroversial proposition in 
mainstream American legal thought” which “finds expression in numerous 
historical sources, including both primary sources such as judicial opinions 
and statutes, and secondary sources.”148  Relatedly, government lawyers 
must “take an oath, separate from their bar oath, to uphold the United States 
Constitution and the laws of this nation,” and their “compensation comes 
not from a client whose interests they are sworn to protect from the power 
of the state, but from the state itself and the public fisc.”149  As the Supreme 
Court observed in Polk County v. Dodson,150 a government lawyer “is not 
amenable to administrative direction in the same sense as other employees 
of the State.”151  Rather, a government lawyer “works under canons of 
professional responsibility that mandate his exercise of independent 
judgment.”152  As such, a government “lawyer is not, and by the nature of 
his function cannot be, the servant of an administrative superior.”153 
CONCLUSION 
The unusual role lawyer speech plays, both as the embodiment of law 
and as the fulfillment of professional obligations, sets it apart from that of 
other government employees.  Government lawyer speech serving a 
checking value function ought to receive heightened protection, whether the 
speech is information providing, watchdogging, or whistleblowing, so long 
as the speech does not run counter to professional ethics obligations.  
Consider the Supreme Court’s recent revisiting of Pickering, Connick, and 
Garcetti in a 2014 decision.  In Lane v. Franks,154 the Court held that the 
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First Amendment protects the speech of a government employee testifying 
under oath about crimes witnessed in the course of employment: 
 Truthful testimony under oath by a public employee outside the scope 
of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment 
purposes.  That is so even when the testimony relates to his public 
employment or concerns information learned during that employment.155 
The lower court had rejected Lane’s First Amendment argument, giving 
what Justice Sotomayor (authoring the unanimous opinion) called “short 
shrift to the nature of sworn judicial statements” and “ignor[ing] the 
obligation borne by all witnesses testifying under oath.”156  In reconciling 
the opinion with Garcetti, Justice Sotomayor explained that the “critical 
question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily 
within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns 
those duties.”157 
The logic of Lane supports a framework where government lawyers’ 
speech is protected under the First Amendment in the same way as citizens 
speaking on a matter of public concern, though admittedly not explicitly in 
the Court’s opinion.  Justice Sotomayor emphasized that the Court’s 
“precedents dating back to Pickering have recognized that speech by public 
employees on subject matter related to their employment holds special 
value precisely because those employees gain knowledge of matters of 
public concern through their employment.”158  Indeed, she observed that the 
“importance of public employee speech is especially evident in the context 
of this case:  a public corruption scandal.”159  Notably, the speech at issue 
in both Connick and Garcetti could be said to address the same sort of 
public corruption scandals, though the speakers were not under oath to 
testify.  Yet both, as lawyers, were under similar obligations as officers of 
the court and members of the legal profession. 
Even if government lawyer speech is protected as contemplated by this 
Article, under Pickering, a second question must be addressed:  “whether 
the government had ‘an adequate justification for treating the employee 
differently from any other member of the public’ based on the 
government’s needs as an employer.”160  On the one hand, “government 
employers often have legitimate ‘interest[s] in the effective and efficient 
fulfillment of [their] responsibilities to the public,’ including ‘promot[ing] 
efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties,’ and 
‘maintain[ing] proper discipline in public service.’”161  On the other hand, 
“a stronger showing [of government interests] may be necessary if the 
employee’s speech more substantially involve[s] matters of public 
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concern.”162  In Lane, relevant to the Court was the fact that the 
government could not demonstrate an “interest that tips the balance in their 
favor.  There was no evidence, for example, that Lane’s testimony . . . was 
false or erroneous or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed any sensitive, 
confidential, or privileged information while testifying.”163  A similar 
analysis follows in the case of government lawyers, grounded in 
professional duties.  Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, the speech of 
lawyers is constrained exceptionally by professional ethics rules in order to 
effectuate legal advice and advocacy,164 while at the same time requiring 
speech in certain circumstances.  Thus, to apply the so-called second prong 
of Pickering, a court should ask “whether the government had ‘an adequate 
justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of 
the public’”165 based upon professional conduct rules. 
Given the steadily increasing presence of the regulatory state in our 
democratic government, the justifications for protecting lawyer speech 
based upon its checking value are especially robust in the context of 
workplace assessment when the lawyer is carrying out professional 
obligations.  By applying this framework rather than what the Court did in 
Connick and Garcetti, members of the legal profession faced with concerns 
about governmental abuse of power would be permitted to exercise their 
professional judgment in deciding whether to engage in information 
providing, watchdogging, or whistleblowing functions.  Protecting the 
workplace assessment speech of government lawyers, who are subject to 
greater professional obligations and duties than other government 
employees, can serve as a desirable check against abuse of power by 
officials and at the same time help legitimize the role of the regulatory state 
in American democracy. 
 
 162. Id. (alterations in original). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT ¶ 3.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (“A 
lawyer shall not . . . assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a 
witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, 
the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused . . . .”); id. ¶ 1.2(d) 
(“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer 
knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any 
proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good 
faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.”); id. ¶ 1.6(a) 
(“A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the 
client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation or the disclosure is permitted . . . .”); id. ¶ 1.4(a)(3) (“A lawyer shall . . . keep 
the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter . . . .”); id. ¶ 3.6(a) (“A lawyer 
who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not 
make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be 
disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of 
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.”); id. ¶ 7.1 (“A lawyer shall 
not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services.”). 
 165. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418). 
